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Abstract. This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial 
intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the 
non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with 
the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘free-
dom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ 
through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do 
not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the 
non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian 
ethical performer instead.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, categorical imperative, choice, freedom of will, Kantian ethics, moral 
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Kantiškasis moralės subjektas ir dirbtinio intelekto etika
Santrauka. Straipsnyje aptariami filosofiniai klausimai, susiję su kantiškuoju moralės subjektu ir dirbtiniu 
intelektu. Straipsnio tikslas – pateikti išsamią Kanto etikos analizę, kad būtų išaiškintas kantiškojo moralės 
subjekto kaip pareigos mašinos neįgyvendinamumas. Kantiškos mašinos galimybė, regis, dera su tikruoju 
kantiškuoju moralės subjektu. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad mašinų moralėje „pareiga“ turėtų būti atliekama su 
„valios laisve“ ir „laime“, nes Kantas rašė apie žmogaus polinkį „prigimtinę būtinybę“ vertinti „laimės“ kaip 
tikslo požiūriu. Galiausiai straipsnyje tvirtinama, kad kantiškoji „valios laisvė“ ir „pasirinkimo galimybė“ 
neturi nieko bendra su deterministiniu „subjekto“ modeliu, kadangi tai esą šventi dalykai. Daroma išvada, jog 
kantiškasis dirbtinio intelekto subjektas neįmanomas dėl pačių tikrosios Kanto etikos pagrindų, ir vietoj to 
siūlomas naudos kategorija besiremiantis kantiškosios etikos išpildytojas.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: dirbtinis intelektas, kategorinis imperatyvas, pasirinkimas, valios laisvė, moralės 
subjektas, nauda
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Introduction
AI technology has been invented as the augmented intelligence to humanity (Rossi 2016). 
However, over time, the goal has been shifted to invent autonomous ethical agents that 
can mimic human ethical decision-making processes without any human intervention. 
Susan Leigh Anderson and Michael Anderson have summarised this advancement and 
claimed, “Ideally, we would like to be able to trust autonomous machines to make correct 
ethical decisions on their own, and this requires that we create an ethic for machines” 
(Anderson & Anderson 2011: 1). The probability divides AI enthusiasts into two con-
flicting groups. One group believes in the feasibility of an entirely autonomous ethical 
artificial agent (strong AI supporter), and the other group negates the previous possibility 
(weak AI supporter). Generally, the term ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ pertains to those who have 
the rationale to judge whether a particular action is agreeable or not. It means that the 
term is solely applicable to a sentient and rational being. Previously we believed that only 
human beings are sentient enough to be entitled to rational capacities. It seems unnatural to 
call any artefact an ethical or moral agent in the same sense (Wallach & Allen 2009: 55). 
Intelligent systems are close companions to our daily life, and their actions can influence 
our civilisation positively as well as negatively. The performances of these systems as 
independent moral agents will be a critical question that has to be evaluated accurately to 
enhance the positive impact of AI technology and minimise the adverse effect.
Here the fundamental elements are the ascription of moral agency on intelligent 
machines and the consistency of their moral decision-making process. Though Isaac 
Asimov had introduced three basic rules for robots to be moral agents, these would be 
insufficient for the guidance framework of future automatons (Asimov 1950). Nowadays, 
our daily life is much more dependent on autonomous systems and intelligent sensor-
based prediction systems. Though AI scientists anticipate that a superhuman artificial 
general intelligence (AGI) can be invented in the future, the current development is not 
close enough as it was expected earlier. However, the result reveals that if the technology 
goes wrong or malfunctions in any way, it will certainly turn up as a devil for the entire 
civilisation. Elon Musk once claimed that “with artificial intelligence, we are summoning 
the demon”.1 Therefore, we need a deliberate ethical structure for AI agents from the be-
ginning to enhance its positive impact on human society. To get a proper solution to this 
conflict, we must analyse the applicability of the term ‘moral agent’ to AI machines and 
its’ difference from the moral agency of human beings. In seeking the resolution, we will 
primarily focus on Kantian ethics. In due course of the discussion, we will first focus on 
the concept of Immanuel Kant’s ‘moral agent’, and then, we will be able to evaluate the 
moral agency of the AI system from a Kantian perspective. As we judge these systems 
1  Elon Musk has further demanded that AI technology has the potency to drive us to Mars and accomplish our 
daily duties smartly, but on the other hand, it can be more dangerous than any nuclear weapon if not handled with 
care by government regulatory authorities from the initial phase of application. He warned that AI could be turned 
into the biggest existential threat for the entire humanity. (https://www.cnet.com/news/elon-musk-we-are-summon-
ing-the-demon-with-artificial-intelligence/ [accessed April 3, 2020]).
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from their performance related to human beings, we shall assess them within our ethical 
evaluative paradigm. The anthropocentric evaluative paradigm can be helpful for the 
prospect of the Kantian machine. However, it seems to be conflicting to the supporters of 
posthumanism (Evans 2015: 378).
Kantian ethics is precisely an anthropocentric evaluative paradigm. Kant has not expli-
citly stated anything about non-anthropocentric moral agency (1997: 28-29).2 However, 
philosopher Thomas M. Powers has argued that “A rule-based ethical theory is a good 
candidate for the practical reasoning of machine ethics because it generates duties or rules 
for action, and rules are (for the most part) computationally tractable” (Powers 2006: 46-
47). Our paper aims to analyse the probability of a Kantian machine and justify whether 
it can be a genuine Kantian moral agent. To accomplish the goal, we shall discuss in this 
paper several Kantian notions like duty, categorical imperative, freedom of will, and fac-
ulty of choice. As Kant has not speculated any probability of artificial moral agency, we 
intend to extend the Kantian analysis of moral agency and equate it with machine morality. 
Kant acknowledged that humans are entitled to ‘reason’ as a faculty to judge unbiasedly; 
therefore, human beings can be considered as moral agents (2002: 17).3 However, AI ro-
bots can be the perfect simulacrum of human moral agents without any conscious moral 
agency, and their rationality is algorithmic. It is dependent on the human programmer. 
Therefore, the moral agency of AI robots will be unlike genuine Kantian moral agency.
Kantian Moral Agency
Conventionally we denominate any human being as a ‘moral agent’ when s/he has moral 
consciousness. They can judge any action as legitimate or not concerning the welfare of 
human society. In this regard, Kant claimed in Critique of Pure Reason that only human 
beings could conquer the pathologically necessitated causal connection between actions 
and effects and ‘transcendental freedom’ is intrinsic to rational beings. In Kant’s words 
(1998: 533):
…it is this transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is ground-
ed, and the former constitutes the real moment of the difficulties in the latter, which have long 
surrounded the question of its possibility. Freedom in the practical sense is the independence 
2  Kant claimed, “Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot rea-
son it out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently 
given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based 
on any intuition, either pure or empirical, although it would be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed; 
but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required, which certainly cannot be assumed 
here”. (Critique of Practical Reason, 5.31)
3  Kant has claimed that human morality will be dependent on their faculty of ‚reason‘, which disarticulate the 
actions from the expectations of effects. He asserted that nothing other than the sense of ‘duty’ in itself, which occurs 
only in the rational being insofar as it, especially not the urge for the outcome, is the determining ground of the will. 
Therefore, it constitutes that pre-existing goodwill which we call ‘moral sense’, and which is already present in the 
person who acts in accordance with it. It cannot be derived from the outcome of her/his actions. (Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:402)
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of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice 
is sensible insofar as it is pathologically affected (through moving-causes of sensibility); it is 
called an animal power of choice (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated. 
The human power of choice is indeed an arbitrium sensitivum, yet not brutum but liberum, be-
cause sensibility does not render its action necessary, but in the human being there is a faculty 
of determining oneself from oneself, independently by sensible impulses. 
Here, Kant argued that the rest of the animal kingdom is necessitated by their instincts, 
hence will not be bestowed with moral agency. The pathological necessitation is enclosed 
by the scientific causal chain, which seems unbreakable within the sensible world. Further, 
Kant argued (1998: 533-534):
…it is easy to see if all causality in the world of sense were mere nature, then every occurrence 
would be determined in time by another in accord with necessary laws, and hence – since 
appearances, insofar as they determine the power of choice, would have to render every ac-
tion necessary as their natural consequence – the abolition of transcendental freedom would 
also simultaneously eliminate all practical freedom. For the latter presupposes that although 
something has not happened, it nevertheless ought to have happened, and its cause in appear-
ance was thus not so determined that there is no causality in our power of choice such that, 
independently of those natural causes and even opposed to their power and influence, it might 
produce something determined in the temporal order in accord with empirical laws, and hence 
begin a series of occurrences entirely from itself. 
The ‘transcendental freedom’ is the fundamental requirement of morality. Kant pos-
tulated a distinct type of parallel causality, which coexists with scientific causality. He 
entitled this novel causality as ‘transcendental causality’. Any actions influenced by the 
latter will be free from any causal bondage of the sensible world. He claimed that our 
‘free will’ is an expression of ‘transcendental causality’ (Sidgwick 1988: 405-412). Here 
Kant has introduced the notion of ‘choice’ as another faculty, which helps us to surpass 
the scientific causal chain. It further assists us in performing moral deeds. He entitled 
human beings as rational beings because they are subjected to both phenomenal and 
transcendental rules simultaneously.
However, the faculty of ‘choice’ helps us overcome the sensible world’s temptation 
and follows our moral consciousness. This faculty of ‘choice’ segregates us from other 
pathological beings, like animals. Kant argued that ‘moral agency’ requires the freedom to 
choose. Hence, those entitled to any one of these causalities cannot be bestowed as ‘moral 
agents’. Animals are only subjected to sensible causality and lack of rational competence, 
which is required for moral understanding; therefore, they are devoid of moral agency.4 
Similarly, Kant claimed (2002: 30-31):
4  Kant has not explicitly negated the scope of non-anthropocentric moral agency in his analysis. Rather he 
claimed that any being which possesses sufficient rational competency can hold ‘moral agency’. However, it is quite 
evident that Kant has explicitly emphasised on human moral agency in his entire course of philosophy as he believed 
that non-human beings can be rational as well, but they are not sufficiently capable of overcoming the realm of 
‘sensibility’ and think beyond it. This is why humans preserve a higher abode among all other organisms according 
to Kant. (Critique of Pure Reason, A 534/ B 562 - A 535/ B 563)
Moralės filosofija riya Manna, rajakishore Nath. Kantian Moral agency and the Ethics of artificial intelligence
143
A perfectly good will would thus stand just as much under objective laws (of the good), but 
it would not be possible to represent it as necessitated by them to lawful actions, because of 
itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only place through 
the representation of the good. Hence for the divine will, and in general for a holy will, no 
imperatives are valid; the ought is out of place here, because the volition is of itself already 
necessarily in harmony with the law. Hence imperatives are only formulas expressing the rela-
tion of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or 
that rational being, e.g., to the human being. 
In this regard, Kant claimed that if someone is solely subjected to transcendental caus-
ality, then s/he would not achieve the option to perform otherwise. Kant has denominated 
them as the ‘holy will’. Their actions will necessarily follow the transcendental causality; 
hence there is no ‘choice’ to execute otherwise. The word ‘ought’ is only relevant to human 
performers who have the alternatives to act against their ‘reason’. Still, they choose to follow 
rational thinking to be ‘moral’. Kant introduced the notion of ‘imperative’ in this regard. 
Moreover, according to Kant, all moral rules should conform with the form of the categori-
cal imperative, which is universal, thereby demarcating it from hypothetical imperatives. 
Kant narrated, “The categorical imperative would be that one which represented an action as 
objectively necessary for itself, without any reference to another end” (2002: 31). For him, 
hypothetical imperatives are dependent on an external condition for its applicability, which 
is ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’. In contrast, categorical imperative bears its justification within 
itself. The self-evident nature makes the categorical imperative universal, inherently neces-
sary, and indifferent to its actualisation,5 whereas hypothetical imperatives are contrary to it. 
Our free will should be guided only by the categorical imperative to actualise moral actions. 
In Kant’s words (2002: 63):
Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every effect was possible 
only in accordance with the law that something else determined the efficient cause to 
causality; what else, then, could the freedom of the will be, except autonomy, i.e., the 
quality of the will of being a law to itself? But the proposition ‘The will is in all actions 
a law to itself’ designates only the principle of acting in accordance with no other maxim 
than that which can also have itself as a universal law as its object. But this is just the 
formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality: thus a free will and 
a will under moral laws are the same. 
5  Kant claimed, “The fact mentioned above is undeniable. One need only analyze the judgment that people pass 
on the lawfulness of their actions in order to find that, whatever inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, 
incorruptible and self-constrained, always holds the maxim of the will in an action up to the pure will, that is, to itself 
inasmuch as it regards itself as a priori practical. Now this principle of morality, just on account of the universality 
of the law-giving that makes it the formal supreme determining ground of the will regardless of all subjective dif-
ferences, is declared by reason to be at the same time a law for all rational beings insofar as they have a will, that 
is, the ability to determine their causality by the representation of rules, hence insofar as they are capable of actions 
in accordance with principles and consequently also in accordance with a priori practical principles (for these alone 
have that necessity which reason requires for a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to human beings only but ap-
plies to all finite beings that have reason and will and even includes the infinite being as the supreme intelligence” 
(1997: 32)
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Kant upheld an impassable division between the categorical imperative and hypothetical 
imperative. He famously disseminated three maxims as three different expressions of the 
categorical imperative. According to him, hypothetical imperatives are not the efficient 
cause of our actions; instead, they work as the formal cause. That means hypothetical im-
peratives could not certify and necessitate our actions. Only categorical imperative works 
as an efficient cause and can determine our practical actions. Hypothetical imperatives 
depend on the external condition of ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’. It loses its desirability if 
we dissolve its outcome. Kant asserted (1998: 677):
Happiness is the satisfaction of all of our inclinations (extensive, with regard to their manifold-
ness, as well as intensive, with regard to a degree, and also potensive, with regard to duration). 
The practical law from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of prudence), but that 
which is such that it has no other motive than the worthiness to be happy I call moral (moral 
law). The first advises us what to do if we want to partake of happiness; the second commands 
how we should behave in order even to be worthy of happiness. 
In this regard, Kant segregated freewill from the heteronomous will and argued that 
the latter remains integral with an upshot of ‘self-love’ or ‘one’s own happiness’. Further, 
he claimed (1997: 19-20):
All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind 
and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness… Now, a rational 
being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole 
existence is happiness, and the principle of making this the supreme determining ground of 
choice is the principle of self-love. Thus all material principles, which place the determining 
ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be felt in the reality of some object, are 
wholly of the same kind insofar as they belong without exception to the principle of self-love 
or one’s own happiness. 
It is contrary to the Kantian notion of ‘duty’ and genuine moral agency. Only free will 
has the authority to usher a righteous deed and perform following one’s duty. Sometimes 
humans are considered as pathological beings because they often encountered both 
heteronomous and autonomous will (Kleingeld 2010: 55-72). But our rationality keeps 
commanding us to follow our free will and operate morally. Therefore, the Kantian moral 
agency requires free will, faculty of ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’, sense of ‘duty’, and categor-
ical imperative to execute concrete moral actions. Now, if we quest for its applicability to 
AI, we must start with the analysis of ‘artificial moral agency’ and its features.
Artificial Moral Agency
Today’s AI technology is primarily dependent on initial programming and big data sets. 
However, AI scientists anticipate that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will be able 
to self-programme and be a comprehensive simulacrum of human intelligence. They 
entitled it as the time of ‘singularity’ (Tegmark 2017: 261). ‘Singularity’ is explained as 
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an intelligent explosion, which will be powerful enough to replicate the human moral 
agency as well as the brain itself (Kurzweil 2005: 17). This claim postulates the ethical 
decision-making process as the effect of brain states; hence, it can be simulated by artifi-
cial neurons as well. Precisely, if an artificial neuronal structure can imitate the biological 
brain state, which is responsible for a particular moral deed/thought, then reproducing 
that moral act in artificial performers will be spontaneous. Therefore, the supporters of 
‘singularity’ believe that superintelligent AI agents will be moral agents just like any 
rational human being. It is justified to hold them responsible for their actions (Kurzweil 
2005: 314).6 However, AI’s present development trend does not ensure any particular 
anticipated time of ‘singularity’ so far.
In this regard, if we try to analyse the present status of artificial moral agency, then 
we shall find that these systems follow hypothetical imperatives. These imperatives are 
encrypted as a command at the coding level by some human programmers. That is to 
say, the programmer must prefer some specific set of human values while choosing the 
correct command for that intelligent machine. Undoubtedly, that specific human value is 
happiness or pleasure (Bostrom 2014: 227). It entails that AI robots are performing the 
actions following the rules which are encrypted in them. Programmers prefer those rules 
because they certify to provide pleasure or happiness to the user of that intelligent machine. 
From a Kantian approach, we can claim that the actions of these artificial agents are due to 
the effect of heteronomous ‘will’ determination. Precisely, here the external factor as the 
determinant of ‘will’ is the ‘happiness or pleasure’ of human users (Johnson 2006: 202).
We acknowledge that the concept of ‘happiness or pleasure’ is entirely subjective. What 
is pleasurable to one might not be the same for the other. Here, the agency of the AI robots 
will depend on its user’s preference, which sometimes might be of some moral inclinations 
as well. This autonomy of performance might not be as robust as human agency, but still, 
we can consider it autonomous to some extent (Nath 2009, 2020; Sullins 2006: 25). The 
artificial agency conveyed the focus on data and its collaborations using cybernetic as 
well as computation theory. However, the agency lies in the broader perspective of the 
analysis of the shared relation rather than mere statistical data (Farnsworth 2017: 237). 
We tend to maintain human moral agency as superior because we believe it includes some 
intervening layers that the artificial moral agency might not ever achieve. It necessitates 
us to judge AI’s action as an expression of its human programmer’s values (Hall 2011: 
513). So far as we know, the entire inference is based on the disparity between conscious 
moral agency and non-conscious moral agency. However, this disparity does not work 
as the only hindrance to the prospects for Kantian machines. In this regard, we shall next 
discuss our first argument from the perspective of Kantian ‘duty’.
6  In his book Singularity is Near, author Ray Kurzweil has used a quotation of philosopher Nick Bostrom: 
“Substrate is morally irrelevant, assuming it doesn’t affect functionality or consciousness. It doesn’t matter, from a 
moral point of view, whether somebody runs on silicon or biological neurons (just as it doesn’t matter whether you 
have dark or pale skin). On the same grounds that we reject racism and speciesism, we should also reject carbon-
chauvinism, or bioism” (the quotation from Ethics for Intelligent Machines: A Proposal, 2001).
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Argument from duty
Some AI thinkers believe that a Kantian machine will be a perfect example of a performer 
who can unbiasedly follow the ‘duty’. It will be devoid of any emotional partialities like 
biological beings. For instance, some researchers have claimed that Kantian machines 
can be the opposite of ‘Lie Bots’ from the background of performing duties (Bendel et 
al., 2017: 7-11). That is to say, the plausibility of ‘objectivity’ is the crucial feature that 
compels scientists about the possibility of Kantian AI. On this issue, Thomas M. Power 
has claimed, “In fact, humans suffer from ‘weaknesses of the will’, as Aristotle called 
them, that shouldn’t be a problem for a machine: once it reaches a conclusion about what 
it ought or ought not to do, the output will follow automatically” (Powers 2006: 46). 
According to his claim, the Kantian sense of ‘objectivity’ in performance seems feasible 
for automatons. To find whether or not a Kantian ‘duty’ can be performed by an AI agent, 
we must deep dive into the Kantian analysis of actions.
Kant has segregated ‘actions’ into three diverse categories, i.e., immoral action, amoral 
action, and moral action, in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Here moral 
action refers to that action which emanates from ‘duty’ itself and nothing else, and immoral 
action lies at the opposite, which contradicts ‘duty’. We will concentrate precisely on the 
notion of amoral actions concerning AI’s performance of ‘duty’ as an objective performer. 
Kant has narrated amoral action as a deed, performed merely in conformity with ‘duty’, 
not essentially necessitated from it. As Kant argued (2002: 13):
It is much harder to notice this difference where the action is in conformity with duty and the 
subject yet has besides this an immediate inclination to it. E.g., it is indeed in conformity with 
duty that the merchant should not overcharge his inexperienced customers, and where there is 
much commercial traffic, the prudent merchant also does not do this, but rather holds a firm 
general price for everyone, so that a child buys just as cheaply from him as anyone else. 
According to him, amoral actions are not motivated to achieve happiness, appreciation, 
or other rewards. The performance of this action is used as a path to achieve those goals, 
as mentioned earlier. As these actions are not performed from ‘freedom of will’ and the 
sense of ‘duty’, they cannot be of any moral significance.
The performance of an AI agent seems to be of moral significance, sometimes con-
cerning its outcome. As we have seen, in the case of artificial moral agency, AI agents 
are motivated by the happiness principle (happiness of the user) as a goal to achieve, and 
their duty is measured in terms of whether or not it conforms with the purpose (Bostrom 
2014: 227). From the Kantian perspective, we can claim that AI’s moral deeds are not 
generated from the ‘freedom of will’ and the sense of ‘duty’ itself. These systems perform 
their actions as per the programmer’s command; hence we can claim their actions as 
amoral actions that run in accordance with ‘duty’ (here ‘duty’ means perform according 
to its programming level). There is no choice for these systems to do otherwise. The 
term itself indicates amoral actions are neither permissible nor impermissible. It neither 
violates one’s duty nor conforms to the same. It is neither ethically better nor worse than 
any other action. It is simply morally unevaluated.
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AI agents might be better performers than human beings to a restricted extent, but their 
actions are amoral and hold a lower magnitude of value. The commands are encrypted in 
AI’s coding to accomplish some action, which will be helpful to achieve our needs. Instead 
of being a Kantian machine, these intelligent systems can be better evaluated as happiness 
provider machines. Kant has claimed that we tend to assess our ‘natural necessity’ by our 
happiness as an end.7 In the case of an AI agent, ‘happiness’ denotes the moral quality of 
the action concerning its user, the accuracy of the predictions, and its overall impact on 
the entire human society (Kaplan 2016: 75). However, all these do not sound coherent 
with the Kantian moral action performed from ‘freedom of will’ and necessitated by cat-
egorical imperative. We will discuss these issues in the following sections of the paper.
Argument from categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is the unconditional command, which is an end in itself, and 
one should follow it to perform one’s own ‘duty’. In Kant’s words , “So act as if the 
maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature” (2002: 
38). The categorical imperative is an apriori truth and works as a presupposition of our 
moral actions. That means it works as the ‘form’ of moral action, whereas a particular 
moral action works as the content. We tend to analyse whether or not our specific action 
fits in the structure of categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, to be sure, is 
a command. But it is a rule for action, not an act itself. Moreover, its application does 
not make an act moral but rather shows whether a contemplated action is ethical or not. 
We can analyse that any deed follows a particular pattern at the time of occurrence, i.e., 
Intention> Action> Consequences. The categorical imperative corresponds with our sense 
of ‘duty’, which is emphasised in the first two sections (intention and action). According 
to Kant (2002: 46):
…the human will is a categorical imperative, then it must be such from the representation of 
that which, being necessarily an end for everyone, because it is an end in itself, constitutes an 
objective principle of the will, hence can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this 
principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself.
The intention part plays a fundamental role in defining moral action. Following the 
Kantian sense of unconditional ‘duty’, the categorical imperative command does not judge 
any act from its consequence. 
There is another imperative that emphasises the consequence part, i.e., hypothetical 
imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives hold the format of ‘if-then’, which describes do-
ing a specific action if someone wants to achieve a particular goal. Here the goals are 
determined by ‘heteronomy of will’, which contradicts Kantian ‘autonomy of will’ or 
7  Kant used this claim to distinguish ‘assertoric’ imperatives from the ‘problematic’ imperatives and argued for 
the imperfect duties, such as, helping others achieve specific and diverse goals. (Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, 4:415 – 4:416)
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‘freedom of will’ (Frankfurt 1971: 6-7). As our heteronomous will is subjective, it cannot 
necessitate a particular moral action. Hence, in the case of ‘hypothetical imperatives’, it 
does not command us to act just because it is our ‘duty’. Kant has narrated (2002: 45):
The subjective ground of desire is the incentive, the objective ground of volition is the motive; 
hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ones, 
which depend on motives that are valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal 
when they abstract from all subjective ends; but they are material when they are grounded on 
these, hence on certain incentives. The ends that a rational being proposes as effects of its ac-
tion at its discretion (material ends) are all only relative; for only their relation to a particular 
kind of faculty of desire of the subject gives them their worth, which therefore can provide 
no necessary principles valid universally for all rational beings and hence valid for every 
volition, i.e., practical laws. Hence all these relative ends are only the ground of hypothetical 
imperatives.
Instead, it directs us to act in a specific way to achieve a particular goal, which means 
it will not be universally applicable to all rational beings as an unconditional command.
Now, as far as the performance of an AI agent is concerned, it works according to 
hypothetical rules. These rules are encrypted in the command system, and it navigates the 
system to work in a particular technique to accomplish specific goals. It is speculated that 
if AI robots can successfully execute moral actions as an intelligent computing device, they 
can be a ‘hypothetical moral agent’ at their best (Powers 2009). Indeed, this ‘hypothetical 
moral agent’ will challenge the Kantian conception of autonomy of moral agency. Even 
if we reformulate categorical imperative to make it computable, we can encode it as an 
unconditioned command in the computing system. It can be encoded in a hypothetical 
command, which consists of actions to achieve some set of goals (Powers 2006: 47-48). 
Therefore, we can claim that computable categorical imperative is converting itself into 
a hypothetical imperative; hence, it is becoming redundant.
Suppose we assume that in the future, categorical imperative can be embodied success-
fully in AI machines and create a Kantian moral agent. In that case, indeed, all machines 
will not hold the same amount of moral rationality. According to their moral rationality, 
we must predetermine some rules to make them implementable in the machines (Powers 
2006: 51). Though AI scientists are not even close enough to a machine that can suc-
cessfully replicate a Kantian moral agent and act according to the categorical imperative. 
According to Kant, the two foundations of the categorical imperative are ‘freedom of will’ 
and ‘faculty of choice’. We will discuss these issues in the next section.
Argument from ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’
Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ are the foundation of his conception of 
‘duty’ and ‘autonomy’. In the Kantian moral agency section, we have already discussed 
how Kant has depicted ‘freedom of will’ as a transcendental causality that coexists with 
scientific causality (1998: 533-534). ‘Faculty of reason’ works as the force which assists 
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any rational being to follow the transcendental causality of ‘freedom of will’. In literal 
meaning, ‘freedom’ means ‘freedom to’, whereas, for Kant, freedom was ‘freedom from’. 
Here ‘freedom from’ indicates freedom from the slavery of the sensible realm. Kant 
claimed (1998: 542):
…everything which has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds inevitably 
had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least 
believe we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard 
to the actions of human beings as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred 
not through empirical causes, no, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.
Kant believed that ‘freedom of will’ belongs to the intelligible world, which we can 
only feel but cannot grab through empirical evidence. It can be supposed through our moral 
actions, except that everything which follows the scientific causal chain is sacrosanct. 
If we closely observe the mechanism of AI agents, then we can comprehend how 
‘free will’ works for an AI agent. It has been massively debated that an AI system could 
not be entitled to an authentic free will without any minimal conscious agency (Stuart 
& Dobbyn 2002: 410). These systems could not go beyond their encrypted commands 
and perform randomly like sentient beings. In this regard, it should be mentioned that 
here we contemplate ‘freedom of will’ as ‘freedom to perform’, which denotes the ability 
to self-determine between different prospects (Omoregie 2015: 5-6). AI agents are not 
free enough to perform beyond what is written in their command system. All possible 
options are related to our practical world and shall not be determined from the Kantian 
transcendental realm (McCarthy 1995). Hence, without the conscious choice to transcend 
the sensible realm, one could not feel the Kantian ‘freedom of will’. As Kantian ‘freedom 
of will’ works as the foundation of ‘freedom to’, AI agents will not be fit enough to acquire 
‘freedom to’ from the Kantian prospect.
AI systems are deterministic models of agency that do not exceed its initial program-
ming. That is to say if the Kantian machine would exist, then we could not judge them as 
per their intentions behind any action, just like human beings (Wallach et al., 2008: 574). 
In this regard, Kant claimed (1997: 106):
The human being (and with him every rational being) is an end in itself, that is, can never be 
used merely as a means by anyone (not even by God) without being at the same time himself 
an end, and that humanity in our person must, accordingly, be holy to ourselves: for he is the 
subject of the moral law and so of that which is holy in itself, on account of which and in 
agreement with which alone can anything be called holy. For this moral law is based on the 
autonomy of his will, as a free will which, in accordance with its universal laws, must neces-
sarily be able at the same time to agree to that to which it is to subject itself. 
Kant has entitled human beings the highest type of moral agency because they have 
the rational capacity, which can be the end in itself. They can overcome the boundaries of 
the sensible realm and choose not to be deviated by any empirical sensations. According 
to Kant, human beings deserve respect because they can set their end in itself through 
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their rationality. It necessitates that the ‘faculty of choice’ navigates human beings as the 
driving force towards ‘freedom of will’. It is evident that Kantian ‘faculty of choice’ does 
not belong to any deterministic model of agency as these systems are sacrosanct. There-
fore, it can be concluded that any Kantian machine could not acquire Kantian ‘faculty of 
choice’ and ‘freedom of will’ ever.
conclusion
We can conclude that human beings possess a conscious moral understanding, which helps 
them to judge their novel situations. However, we can raise the concern that without a 
‘subjective’ feeling of moral agency, which is precisely the critical topic of contemporary 
debates in AI (Nath & Sahu 2020: 103-111). Our value theories are profoundly related to 
our socio-cultural background. However, Kant has maintained that these socio-cultural 
impacts belong to the sensible realm. If we claim that a Kantian machine is possible, then 
it must obtain all the characteristics of a Kantian moral agent. We have discussed in our 
three arguments that these AI agents, as Kantian machines, could not acquire the features 
of the Kantian moral agency so far. The fundamental components of Kantian ethics lead 
towards a focus on self-determining human competence for rule-making and rule ad-
herence. These components exemplify the fundamental ways in which human attributes 
and competencies, such as practical reasoning, exercising judgment, self-reflection, and 
deliberation, allow for the construction of moral rules that are capable of universalisa-
tion. Such human attributes and competencies are non-existent in artificial intelligence 
and automatons. It entails that human agency must be at the forefront of designing and 
holding accountability for these machines’ ultimate moral behaviour.
These systems tend to be judged as Kantian agents from the perspective of the utility 
of their actions. That is why it has been speculated that Kantian ethics shall not be suf-
ficient to build an equitable AI agent. Many AI enthusiasts have proposed the fusion of 
different ethical theories (Kantian theory, utility theory, or virtue ethics theory) and both 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ (these two approaches are famously used to implement ethical 
guidelines for AI system) approaches to construct the legitimate, ethical framework for 
AI (Etzioni & Etzioni 2017: 413-418).
Kantian ethics provide an anthropocentric attitude to formulate moral rules as Kantian 
ethics is an exclusively rule-based approach to moral agency. It seems to be a challenging 
prospect to make these rule-based values computable. In this context, AI philosopher Nick 
Bostrom has claimed that “Goal system engineering is not yet an established discipline. 
It is not currently known how to transfer human values to a digital computer, even given 
human-level machine intelligence.” (Bostrom 2014: 253). However, we can anticipate 
that goal system engineering will soon be possible, and future development of the AI field 
will help advance it further. A righteous AI agent can be achieved as a result of future 
innovations.  
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